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ARGUMENT 
L SDC—NOT SEL—ORIGINALLY INCURRED THE DAMAGE FOR THE 
LOST 14 UNITS BECAUSE A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION 
ACCRUES WITH A BREACH, NOT WITH DAMAGE. 
RB&G argues that SEL, not SDC, incurred the damage for the lost 14 units, and 
therefore, SEL cannot recover for the lost units "through an assigned claim." (RB&G's 
Br. 10-14.) But RB&G ignores long-standing law that holds that a breach of contract 
action accrues upon the breach, not upon discovery of the damage. And RB&G's 
breaches occurred before SDC assigned its contractual rights to SEL. Therefore, when 
SDC assigned its contractual rights with RB&G to SEL, SDC assigned a valid, completed 
breach of contract cause of action, thereby allowing SEL to recover for the lost 14 units, 
just as SDC would have been able to do. 
A breach of contract requires four essential elements of proof: "(1) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other party, and 
(4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, ^ 14, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 
2001). 
Typically, a cause of action "accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins 
to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." 
Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 2005 UT App 225, ^  9, 114 P.3d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2005). But no so with a cause of action for breach of contract: "a contract action 
ordinarily accrues at the time of breach." S & G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 
913 P.2d 735, 740 (Utah 1996); see also Clarke, 2005 UT App 225,1f 9 (holding that a 
1 
breach of contract cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at 
the time of the breach). 
The breach of contract actions against RB&G accrued in 1993 and 1995 when 
RB&G failed to identify the existing faults on the development.1 Thus, at those 
moments, SDC could assert breach of contract actions against RB&G for damages, 
although the damages were yet undiscovered (hence the delay in asserting the claim and 
the reason for applying the "discovery rule," discussed in SDC/SEL's opening brief at 
31-35, which RB&G did not address or counter in its opposing brief). 
Therefore, when SDC transferred to SEL all of SDC's interest in the two contracts 
with RB&G, SDC assigned its ability to recover for the lost units to SEL (as the assignee 
and successor-in-interest). 
IL SDC ARGUED IN THE TRIAL COURT THAT RB&G OWED SDC AN 
INDEPENDENT DUTY, THUS EXEMPTING RB&G FROM THE 
PROTECTION OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE. 
In the trial court, SDC argued that its negligence claim should survive the 
economic loss rule because RB&G owed SDC an independent duty to act professionally 
and competently. (R. at 362-90.) RB&G even concedes that SDC made this argument in 
the trial court. (RB&G's Br. 16.) But in the next sentence, RB&G contradicts itself and 
1
 RB&G now asserts that there is a question "whether RB&G breached the 
contracts] . . . ." (RB&G's Br. 15.) But as noted in SDC/SEL's opening brief, RB&G 
twice admitted it breached the contracts with SDC. At the summary judgment hearing, in 
arguing that SEL could not assert a breach of contract claim against RB&G, its counsel 
said "the difference here, your Honor, is the contract was fully performed and breached 
before the assignment occurs" (R. at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).) A moment later, he 
reiterated, "so when [the contracts were] assigned, [they 're] breached contract[s]. " (R. 
at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).) 
2 
argues that SDC should be precluded from making this argument because "the Sunridge 
entities did not make these arguments to the trial court and raised them for the first time 
on appeal" [sic]. (RB&G's Br. 16.) 
The trial court found SDC's "independent duty" argument sufficiently raised and 
briefed because it definitely ruled on the issue in deciding RB&G's first motion for 
partial summary judgment. (R. at 539.) In fact, the trial court's ruling adopted "the 
reasons stated in [RB&G's] memoranda" in finding that "SDC's and SEL's negligence 
claims [were] barred by the economic loss rule." (R. at 539.) 
Therefore, SDC did not waive its ability to raise its "independent duty" argument 
in this Court. 
IIL SDC IS NOT TRYING TO RECOVER SEL'S DAMAGES VIA SDC'S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM, 
RB&G next argues that SDC's negligence claim seeks to recover SEL's damages 
for the lost 14 units. (RB&G's Br. 17-18.) As SDC/SEL's opening brief makes clear, 
SDC asserts its "independent duty exception to the economic loss rule" argument in the 
alternative, should the Court preclude either SDC or SEL from recovering for the lost 14 
units under their breach of contract theory. SDC is not trying to double-recover or trying 
to recover SEL's damages, and the Court need not reach SDC's negligence claim should 
SDC or SEL prevail on its breach of contract claim. 
IV. RB&G OWED SDC/SEL AN INDEPENDENT DUTY TO ACT 
PROFESSIONALLY AND COMPETENTLY. RB&G KNEW THIRD 
PARTIES WOULD RELY, TO THEIR DETRIMENT, ON RB&G'S 
CONCLUSIONS. 
As exhaustively laid out in their opening brief, RB&G owed SDC/SEL an 
3 
independent duty to perform competently, professionally, and thoroughly, knowing 
others would rely (to their detriment) upon RB&G's analyses and conclusions. 
In Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974), this Court held that an 
accountant was liable to a third party because the third party relied upon the accountant's 
report, and the accountant knew the third party would rely on the report for a particular 
purpose. Id. at 808. Absence of privity "is not a defense where an accountant... is 
aware of the fact that his work will be relied on by a party or parties . . . ." Id. 
Similarly, in spite of its argument to the contrary (of which there is no support 
from or citation to the record), RB&G knew third parties would rely on its work. The 
raison d'etre for a professional geotechnical engineering firm like RB&G is to provide 
professional, competent guidance and advice to builders and developers on the proper 
(and improper) locations to build, where to put parks, where to put roads, and other 
features, based on existing geologic faults. If a firm like RB&G fails to act competently 
and professional by overlooking the geologic faults it was hired to identify, the 
consequences are significant, not only for the party in privity with RB&G, but for third 
parties as well. 
Indeed, RB&G is acutely aware that third parties rely on its work. In 1986, it was 
the defendants in a law suit captioned Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & 
Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986), in which RB&G argued that it was not liable to 
the plaintiff in negligence. Id. at 59. As though not clear enough from the type of work it 
performs, the Price-Orem case should have made RB&G perfectly aware in 1986 that 
third parties would rely upon its analysis and conclusions. 
4 
V. SDC'S REORGANIZATION IS NOT NEFARIOUS OR UNCOMMON. 
Next, RB&G alleges that SDC/SEL's lost revenue from the 14 units is their own 
fault for lawfully and rightfully employing the corporate form. (RB&G's Br. 25-26.) 
In his deposition, Steven Stewart, the principal of both SDC and SEL, testified that 
his attorneys told him "liability exposure would be less with an LLC" (r. at 268), thus, he 
organized SEL, a Utah limited liability corporation, in 1996. Steward did not create SEL 
for any fraudulent, improper, or illegal purpose, and there is no evidence of that in the 
record. Mr. Stewart engaged in a commonplace business practice of organizing a limited 
liability company to take advantage of its legal status. 
Moreover, Mr. Stewart has not sporadically observed corporate form for these two 
entities. Rather, SDC and SEL were, and always have been, distinct legal entities. SDC 
assigned its interest in the RB&G contracts to SEL to take advantage of the legal benefits 
of an LLC, not to "avoid liabilities." (RB&G's Br. 25-26.) This everyday, routine 
business re-organization should not preclude SDC/SEL from asserting their claims 
against RB&G for negligence and its admitted breaches. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should embrace Judge Bench's persuasive dissent and reverse the court 
of appeals's decision upholding the grant of RB&G's first motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
(This space intentionally left blank.) 
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